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Abstract 
This paper proposes bootstrap tests for the validity of instrumental variables (IV) in just 
identified treatment effect models with endogeneity. We demonstrate that the IV 
assumptions required for the identification of the local average treatment effect (LATE) 
allow us to both point identify and bound the mean potential outcomes (i) of the always 
takers (those treated irrespective of the instrument) under treatment and (ii) of the never 
takers (never treated irrespective of the instrument) under non-treatment. The point 
identified means must lie within their respective bounds, which provides four testable 
inequality moment constraints for IV validity. Furthermore, we show that a similar logic 
applies to testing the assumptions needed to identify distributional features (e.g., local 
quantile treatment effects). Finally, we discuss how testing power can be increased by 
imposing dominance/equality assumptions on the potential outcome distributions of different 
subpopulations. 
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In many economic evaluation problems causal inference is complicated by endogeneity, implying
that the explanatory or treatment variable of interest is correlated with unobserved factors that
also aect the outcome. E.g., when estimating the returns to education, the schooling choice is
plausibly inuenced by unobserved ability (see for instance Card, 1999) which itself most likely
has an impact on the earnings outcome. Due to the endogenous treatment selection (also known
as selection on unobservables) the earnings eect of education is confounded with the unobserved
terms. In the presence of endogeneity, identication relies on the availability of an instrumental
variable (IV) that generates exogenous variation in the treatment. In heterogenous treatment
eect models with a binary treatment (which allow for eect heterogeneity across dierent sub-
populations), an instrument is valid if (i) the potential outcomes are mean independent of the
instrument, (ii) the potential treatment states are not confounded by instrument assignment, and
(iii) the treatment is weakly monotonic in the instrument. In this case, the local average treat-
ment eect (LATE) on those who switch their treatment state as a reaction to a change in the
instrument (the so called compliers) is identied,1 see Imbens and Angrist (1994) and Angrist,
Imbens, and Rubin (1996).2
As endogenous treatment selection is an ubiquitous problem in economics, it is no surprise
that IV estimation is a corner stone of empirical research. Taking the estimation of the returns to
education as an example, a range of instruments have been suggested to control for the endogenous
choice of schooling. Angrist and Krueger (1991) use quarter of birth which is related to years
of education through regulations concerning the school starting age but arguably does not have
1For the identication of (local) quantile treatment eects the mean independence assumptions have to be
strengthened to full independence of the instrument and the joint distribution of potential treatments and potential
outcomes, see Fr olich and Melly (2008).
2Note that under the strong restrictions of eect homogeneity and linearity of the outcome equation, an instru-
ment is valid if it is correlated with the treatment and uncorrelated with the error term (monotonicity is imposed
by construction in this kind of models), see for instance the text book discussions in Peracchi (2001), Wooldridge
(2002), Cameron and Trivedi (2005), and Greene (2008). In this case, the IV estimand can be interpreted as the
average treatment eect (ATE), given that the model is correctly specied. Clearly, the weaker IV restrictions
(uncorrelation instead of the mean independence restrictions and no assumptions on the rst stage) are bought
by stronger structural assumptions. Then, IV validity cannot be tested in just identied models. In the subse-
quent discussion we will focus on heterogenous treatment eect models and show that the LATE assumptions have
testable implications for IV validity.
1a direct eect on income. Card (1995) exploits geographical proximity to college (which should
aect the cost of college education) as instrument for going to college. Further inuential studies
in labor economics include Angrist (1990), who uses the US draft lottery as instrument for
Vietnam veteran status in order to estimate its income eect, and Angrist and Evans (1998), who
investigate the impact of fertility on female labor supply. They use the sex ratio of the rst two
children as an instrument. Having two children with the same sex should increase the likelihood
of a third birth, given that some parents have a preference for a mixed sibling-sex composition.
Many, if not most instruments are far from being undisputed. E.g., the validity of quarter of
birth instruments is contested in Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995). Based on their estimations
and other studies, the authors present evidence on seasonal patterns of births that are related to
family income, physical and mental health, and school attendance rates, factors which may be
correlated with potential wages. As a further example, Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) criticize the
sex ratio-instrument of Angrist and Evans (1998) by arguing that having mixed-sex siblings may
directly aect both the marginal utility of leisure and child rearing costs and, thus, labor supply.
Up to date, arguments in favor or against IV validity are predominantly discussed on theoretical
and behavioral bases, which are frequently not unanimously accepted among researchers. In
contrast, hypothesis tests have not played any role in applications with just identied models.3
Kitagawa (2008), henceforth K08, provides the rst formal test for just identied heterogenous
treatment eect models with a binary instrument based on somewhat more restrictive assumptions
than the ones outlined above, i.e., full independence of the potential outcomes/treatment states
and the instrument instead of mean independence. His method is based on the fact that the
potential outcome distribution under treatment of the always takers (those treated irrespective
of the instrument) as well as the joint distribution of the always takers and compliers are point
identied if the instrument is valid. As shown in Imbens and Rubin (1997), the dierence of both
yields to the distribution under treatment of the compliers. An equivalent result holds for the
3In contrast, tests for IV validity are available for overidentied models where the number of instruments exceeds
the number of endogenous regressors. Sargan (1958) was the rst to propose such a test for the linear IV model
with homogenous eects.
2identication of the compliers outcome distribution under non-treatment. Naturally, the density
of the complier outcomes under treatment and non-treatment must not be negative, which is
a testable implication. Therefore, K08 tests whether negative densities occur in subsets of the
outcome distribution and uses a bootstrap method for inference.
The rst contribution of this paper is the proposition of alternative tests that are based on
mean potential outcomes instead of densities. In the case of a binary instrument, the underlying
intuition is as follows: Under IV validity, the mean potential outcome of the always takers under
treatment is point identied. It simply corresponds to the observed mean outcome in the treated
subpopulation that does not receive the instrument. For the same potential outcome, one can
derive upper and lower bounds in the treated subpopulation receiving the instrument, where the
width of the bounds depends of the relative shares of compliers and always takers. Clearly, the
point identied mean outcome in the absence of the instrument must lie within the parameter
bounds in the presence of the instrument.
If this condition is violated, the instrument either has a direct eect on the mean potential
outcome of the always takers, or the treatment is not monotonic in the instrument, or both. An
equivalent result holds for the never takers (those never treated irrespective of the instrument)
by considering the outcomes of the non-treated receiving the instrument and the non-treated not
receiving the instrument. Therefore, the LATE framework provides us with four testable inequal-
ity moment constraints based on point identifying and bounding the mean potential outcomes of
the always takers under treatment and the never takers under non-treatment. For the practical
implementation we consider three dierent bootstrap methods of which the minimum p-value-
based test with partial recentering proposed by Bennett (2009) appears to have the best nite
sample properties. As the K08 test, our approach tests for necessary, albeit not sucient condi-
tions for IV validity. The latter requires the mean potential outcomes of the always/never takers
to be equal across dierent instrument states. However, only the inequality moment constraints
are testable, rather than equality of means. For this reason, our test becomes more powerful as
the bounds shrink or, put dierently, as the compliers' share becomes relatively smaller to the
3fractions of always takers and never takers, respectively.
As a second contribution, we therefore show how the width of the bounds can be tightened to
increase testing power by imposing dominance of the mean potential outcome of one population
over another (see also Huber and Mellace, 2010, and Zhang and Rubin, 2003). Testing power
is maximized if equality in mean potential outcomes is assumed. Then, the bounds collapse to
a point and the inequality constraints turn into equality constraints. E.g., given that the mean
potential outcomes of the the always takers and compliers are equal, IV validity implies that the
mean outcome of the treated receiving the instrument is equal to that of the treated not receiving
the instrument. This can be easily tested by dierence of means tests. An analogous result holds
for the never takers and the compliers under non-treatment.
Our third contribution is the extension of our testing approach to potential outcome distri-
butions rather than potential means, which requires joint independence of the instrument and
the potential treatments/outcomes. Starting with the upper bounds on the potential outcome
distributions of the always takers under treatment and the never takers under non-treatment, we
derive constrains that are equivalent to K08, namely that complier densities must not be nega-
tive in the mixed populations (where both compliers and always or never takers occur). In addi-
tion, we show that also the lower bounds provide two testable implications which have not been
considered yet. The latter reect the intuitive fact that under the null, the joint probability of
being a complier and having an outcome that lies within a subinterval of the support must never
be larger than the (unconditional) complier share in the population. Similar to the tests based
on mean independence, we also demonstrate how power can be further increased by imposing
stochastic dominance or equality assumptions on the potential outcome distributions of dierent
subpopulations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the IV assumptions in
the LATE framework and the testable implications. Section 3 proposes bootstrap tests based on
moment inequality constraints. Section 4 shows how mean dominance and equality restrictions
can be used (on top of the standard assumptions) to increase testing power. A generalization to
4non-binary instruments is provided in Section 5. Testing under the stronger joint independence
assumption is discussed in Section 6. Simulation results are presented in Section 7. In Section 8,
we apply our methods to the labor market data of Card (1995). Section 9 concludes.
2 IV assumptions and testable implications
Suppose that we are interested in the average eect of a binary and endogenous treatment D 2
f1;0g (e.g., participation in a training) on an outcome Y (e.g., earnings) with bounded support
evaluated at some point in time after the treatment. Under endogeneity, the eect of D is
confounded with some unobserved term U that is correlated with both the treatment and the
outcome. Therefore, identication of treatment eects requires an instrument (Z) that shifts the
treatment but does not have a direct eect on the mean outcome (i.e., any mean impact other
than through the treatment). Denote by D(z) the potential treatment state for Z = z, and by
Y (d;z) the potential outcome for treatment D = d and Z = z (see for instance Rubin, 1974, for
a discussion of the potential outcome notation). In heterogenous treatment eect models, the
observed outcome of some individual i can be written as Yi = '(Di;Zi;Ui), where ' denotes a
general function that might be unknown to the researcher. Likewise, the potential outcome is the
value individual i would receive if the treatment and the instrument were set to particular states,
Yi(d;z) = '(d;z;Ui).
As we observe only one potential outcome for each individual, any identication strategy
relies on identifying assumptions, which may or may not be (partially) testable. Here, we will
focus on those assumptions required for LATE identication. The rst restriction maintained
throughout the discussion is the so-called Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA,
e.g., Rubin, 1990), which rules out interference between units and general equilibrium eects of
the treatment. The SUTVA is formalized in Assumption 1 (see also Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin,
1996) and states that the potential treatments and outcomes of any subject i are unrelated to
the actual treatment and instrument states of any other individual:
5Assumption 1:
Yi(d;z)?(Dj;Zj) and Di(z)?Zj; 8j 6= i, d 2 f0;1g, and z in the support of Z (SUTVA):
For the sake of expositional ease, we will henceforth assume the instrument to be binary
(Z 2 f0;1g), while Section 5 will generalize the results to bounded non-binary instruments. As
discussed in Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996), the population can then be categorized into four
types (denoted by T), according to the treatment behavior as a function of the binary instrument.
The compliers react on the instrument in the intended way by taking the treatment when Z = 1
and abstaining from it when Z = 0. For the remaining three types D(z) 6= z for either Z = 1,
or Z = 0, or both: The always takers are always treated irrespective of the instrument state, the
never takers are never treated, and the deers only take the treatment when Z = 0, see Table 1.
Table 1: Types
Type T D(1) D(0) Notion
at 1 1 Always takers
c 1 0 Compliers
d 0 1 Deers
nt 0 0 Never takers
We cannot directly infer on the type of any individual as either D(1) or D(0) is observed,
but never both. Without further assumptions, neither the share of the dierent types nor their
mean potential outcomes are identied. We therefore impose the following unconfounded type
assumption, which implies that the instrument is assigned independently of the potential treat-
ment states:
Assumption 2:
Pr(T = tjZ = 1) = Pr(T = tjZ = 0) for t 2 fat;c;d;ntg (unconfounded type).
Under Assumption 2, the share of any type conditional on the instrument is equal to its uncon-
ditional proportion in the entire population. It is worth noting that it is not required in the lin-
ear model with eect homogeneity, because the latter imposes considerably stronger functional
form assumptions than the nonparametric framework considered here. Let t  Pr(T = t), t 2
6fat;c;ntg, represent the (unobserved) probability to belong to type T in the population and de-
note by Pdjz  Pr(D = djZ = z) the (observed) conditional treatment probability given the in-
strument. Assumption 2 implies that any of the four conditional treatment probabilities is a com-
bination of two unobserved type proportions, see Table 2.
Table 2: Observed probabilities and type proportions
Cond. treatment prob. type proportions
P1j1  Pr(D = 1jZ = 1) at + c
P0j1  Pr(D = 0jZ = 1) d + nt
P1j0  Pr(D = 1jZ = 0) at + d
P0j0  Pr(D = 0jZ = 0) c + nt
Similarly, each of the four observed conditional means E(Y jD = d;Z = z) is a mixture or
weighted average of the mean potential outcomes of two types (denoted by E(Y (d;z)jT = t)),
where the weights depend on the relative proportions:
E(Y jD = 1;Z = 1) =
at
at + c
 E(Y (1;1)jT = at) +
c
at + c
 E(Y (1;1)jT = c); (1)
E(Y jD = 1;Z = 0) =
at
at + d
 E(Y (1;0)jT = at) +
d
at + d
 E(Y (1;0)jT = d); (2)
E(Y jD = 0;Z = 0) =
c
nt + c
 E(Y (0;0)jT = c) +
nt
nt + c
 E(Y (0;0)jT = nt); (3)
E(Y jD = 0;Z = 1) =
d
nt + d
 E(Y (0;1)jT = d) +
nt
nt + d
 E(Y (0;1)jT = nt): (4)
From Table 2 and expressions (1) to (4) it becomes obvious that further assumptions are
necessary to identify the LATE, namely a mean exclusion restriction, monotonicity of the
treatment in the instrument, and the existence of compliers. Starting with the mean exclusion
restriction, it is required that the instrument does not exhibit an eect on the mean potential
outcomes within any subpopulation (however, it may aect higher moments):
Assumption 3:
E(Y (d;1)jT = t) = E(Y (d;0)jT = t) = E(Y (d)jT = t) for d 2 f0;1g and t 2 fat;c;d;ntg
(mean exclusion restriction),
where the last equality makes explicit that the mean potential outcomes are not a function
7of the instrument. Notice that the mean exclusion restriction is a stronger assumption than
uncorrelation of the instrument and the unobserved term, which is invoked in standard IV
models with a linear outcome equation and homogeneous treatment eects. This is, together
with Assumption 2, the price to pay for considering more exible models (in terms of eect
heterogeneity), which also gives rise to our testable implications.
By the mean exclusion restriction,
E(Y (1;1)jT = at) = E(Y (1;0)jT = at) = E(Y (1)jT = at)
and
E(Y (0;1)jT = nt) = E(Y (0;0)jT = nt) = E(Y (0)jT = nt);
which provides the base for the testable implications outlined further below. Alternatively to
Assumptions 2 and 3, one may assume that they only hold conditional on a vector of observed
variables X as considered in Fr olich (2007), who shows nonparametric identication of the LATE
in the presence of a conditionally valid instrument (given X). In the subsequent discussion, con-
ditioning on X will be kept implicit, such that all results either refer to an supposedly uncondi-
tionally valid instrument or to an analysis within cells of X.
The nal two assumptions required for LATE identication put restrictions on the (non-
)existence of particular types.
Assumption 4:
Pr(D(1)  D(0)) = 1 (monotonicity):
Assumption 4 states that the potential treatment state of any individual does not decrease in
the instrument. This rules out the existence of deers (type d). Note that monotonicity is also
implicitly assumed in the linear IV model, where the eect of the instrument on the treatment is
represented by a homogenous rst stage coecient.
Assumption 5:
Pr(D(1) > D(0)) > 0 (existence of compliers):
8By Assumption 5, a subpopulation of individuals reacts on the instrument such that compliers
do exist. Assumptions 4 and 5 together state that E(DjZ = 1)   E(DjZ = 0) > 0, i.e., that the
instrument has an eect on the treatment. In the IV linear model this implies that the rst stage
coecient must not be zero, which is also referred to as IV relevance.
As deers do not exist, the proportions of the remaining types are identied by P0j1 = nt,
P1j0 = at, P1j1 P1j0 = P0j0 P0j1 = c. Furthermore, the mean potential outcomes of the always
takers under treatment and the never takers under non-treatment are point identied. Expression
(2) simplies to E(Y jD = 1;Z = 0) = E(Y (1;0)jT = at) = E(Y (1)jT = at) under Assumptions
1 to 4, and (4) becomes E(Y jD = 0;Z = 1) = E(Y (0;1)jT = nt) = E(Y (0)jT = nt). This allows
identifying the mean potential outcomes of the compliers under treatment and non-treatment by
E(Y (1)jT = c) = E(Y (1;1)jT = c)
=
Pr(D = 1jZ = 1)  E(Y jD = 1;Z = 1)   Pr(D = 1jZ = 0)  E(Y jD = 1;Z = 0)
Pr(D = 1jZ = 1)   Pr(D = 1jZ = 0)
(5)
and
E(Y (0)jT = c) = E(Y (0;0)jT = c)
=
Pr(D = 0jZ = 0)  E(Y jD = 0;Z = 0)   Pr(D = 0jZ = 1)  E(Y jD = 0;Z = 1)
Pr(D = 1jZ = 1)   Pr(D = 1jZ = 0)
: (6)
Therefore, the LATE on the compliers is obtained by the dierence of (5) and (6) , which simplies
to
Pr(D = 1jZ = 1)  E(Y jD = 1;Z = 1) + Pr(D = 0jZ = 1)  E(Y jD = 0;Z = 1)
E(DjZ = 1)   E(DjZ = 0)
 
Pr(D = 1jZ = 0)  E(Y jD = 1;Z = 0) + Pr(D = 0jZ = 0)  E(Y jD = 0;Z = 0)
E(DjZ = 1)   E(DjZ = 0)
=
E(Y jZ = 1)   E(Y jZ = 0)
E(DjZ = 1)   E(DjZ = 0)
: (7)
The last line gives the well known result that the LATE is identied by the ratio of two dierences
of conditional expectations, namely the intention to treat eect divided by the share of compliers,
9see Imbens and Angrist (1994) and Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996).
Our discussion has demonstrated that Assumptions 1-4 allow pinning down the type propor-
tions as well as the mean potential outcomes of the always takers and never takers under treat-
ment and non-treatment. Together with Assumption 5, this identies the LATE and the mean
potential outcomes of the compliers.4 However, this framework also provides testable implica-
tions for IV validity based on deriving bounds on the mean potential outcomes of the always tak-
ers and never takers in equations (1) and (3), respectively. In fact, the mean potential outcome
of the always takers in equation (1) is bounded by the mean over the upper and lower proportion
of outcomes that corresponds to the share of the always takers in this mixed population. It is
obvious that E(Y jD = 1;Z = 0) = E(Y (1)jT = at) must lie within these bounds, otherwise
either Z has a direct eect on the mean of Y , or the potential treatment state is confounded
with the instrument, or deers exist in (2), or any combination of these violations occurs. An
equivalent result applies to the never takers under non-treatment.
To formalize the discussion, we introduce some further notation and assume for the moment
that the outcome is continuous, while Appendix A.4 shows how the following intuition and the
test procedure discussed in the next section can be adapted to discrete outcomes. Dene the qth
conditional quantile of the outcome yq  G 1(q), with G being the cdf of Y given Z = 1 and




By the results of Horowitz and Manski (1995) (see also the discussion in Huber and Mellace, 2010),
E(Y jD = 1;Z = 1;Y  yq) is the sharp lower bound of the mean potential outcome of the always
takers, implying that all the always takers are concentrated in the lower tail of the distribution
that corresponds to their proportion. Similarly, E(Y jD = 1;Z = 1;Y  y1 q) is the upper bound
by assuming that any always taker occupies a higher rank in the outcome distribution than any
complier. Therefore, the IV assumptions imply that
E(Y jD = 1;Z = 1;Y  yq)  E(Y jD = 1;Z = 0)  E(Y jD = 1;Z = 1;Y  y1 q): (8)
4An equivalent result for the potential outcome distributions of the compliers under slightly stronger assumptions
has been derived by Imbens and Rubin (1997).
10Equivalent arguments hold for the mixed outcome equation of never takers and compliers.




i.e., the proportion of never takers in equation (3). Taking the mean over the lower and upper
share of the outcome distribution corresponding to r we obtain the lower and upper bounds
E(Y jD = 0;Z = 0;Y  yr), E(Y jD = 0;Z = 0;Y  y1 r) on the mean potential outcome of the
never takers. The latter is also point identied by E(Y jD = 0;Z = 1) = E(Y (0)jT = nt), such
that the IV assumptions require that
E(Y jD = 0;Z = 0;Y  yr)  E(Y jD = 0;Z = 1)  E(Y jD = 0;Z = 0;Y  y1 r): (9)
Note that under one-sided non-compliance, only one of (8) and (9) can be tested. Furthermore,
monotonicity holds by construction in this case such that a violation of the remaining testable
constraint points to a non-satisfaction of the exclusion restriction. E.g., when there are no
observations with Z = 0 and D = 1, always takers do not exist (at = 0) and E(Y jD = 1;Z = 0)
is not dened. In addition, the latter case also rules out the existence of deers. Therefore,
monotonicity is satised, but (9) is still useful to test the exclusion restriction on the never
takers.
3 Testing
Expressions (8) and (9) provide us with four testable inequality moment constraints.5 Under the








E(Y jD = 1;Z = 1;Y  yq)   E(Y jD = 1;Z = 0)
E(Y jD = 1;Z = 0)   E(Y jD = 1;Z = 1;Y  y1 q)
E(Y jD = 0;Z = 0;Y  yr)   E(Y jD = 0;Z = 1)










































5Note that expressions (8) and (9) hold under Assumptions 1-4 alone, i.e., the existence of compliers (Assumption
5) is not required. In principle, one could therefore test for IV validity even if the LATE is not identied, which
might, however, not be an interesting exercise in applied work.
11Under the alternative hypothesis that IV validity does not hold at least one and at most two
constraints might be binding. This is the case because violations of the rst and second as well
as of the third and fourth constraints are mutually exclusive, respectively. Furthermore, note
that even if no inequality constraint is violated, IV validity may not be satised. I.e., we detect
violations only if they are large enough such that the point identied mean outcomes of the always
takers and/or never takers lie outside their respective bounds in the mixed populations. Ideally,
we would like to test for the equality of the mean outcomes of the respective population across
instrument states. However, this is not feasible as it remains unknown which individuals in the
mixed populations belong to the group of always/never takers or compliers. Therefore, without
further assumptions, testing based on inequality moment constraints is the best one can get. It
is obvious that such tests gain power as the proportion of compliers decreases, implying that the
bounds on the mean outcomes of the always and never takers become tighter.
Several methods have been proposed for testing inequality constraints. The rst approach
generalizes the standard Wald, LM, and LR statistics to test for inequality constraints and goes
back to Wolak (1987, 1989b), who considers a linear regression framework, as well as Kodde and
Palm (1986) and Wolak (1989a, 1991), who propose tests for nonlinear models. The idea is to
compare the parameter estimates of the constrained model with those of the unconstrained model
under the least favorable conguration (LFC, i.e., the parameter conguration for which the null
is rejected with the lowest probability) to obtain a test with asymptotically exact size. The lim-
itation of this approach is that when the covariance matrix of the parameters depends on un-
known parameters, nding the LFC might become complicated. Indeed, the limiting distribution
of the test statistic is a non-trivial mixture of 2 distributions (see Perlman, 1969 and Kudo,
1963) with weights that depend on the covariance matrix of the parameters which in turn de-
pends on the unknown parameters. The appendix outlines the estimation of the parameter vector
 = (1;2;3;4)T in a GMM framework and the construction of the test proposed by Wolak
(1991).
An alternative is to use tests that are based on the bootstrap (see Efron, 1979). As shown
12in Appendix A.1, we can easily obtain asymptotically normally distributed estimators of all
components of  such that  itself has a continuous asymptotic distribution, which justies the use
of the bootstrap as valid inference method. Apart from circumventing the problem of deriving the
non-trivial limiting distribution of the test statistic, bootstrap procedures are often more accurate
in nite samples than methods relying asymptotic theory (which may be a poor approximation
for the sample at hand). Therefore, we consider three dierent bootstrap tests and evaluate their
nite sample performance in Section 7.
Let ^  = (^ 1; ^ 2; ^ 3; ^ 4)T denote the vector of estimates of the respective population
parameters  based on an i.i.d. sample containing n observations. Furthermore, denote by
^ b = (^ 1;b^ 2;b; ^ 3;b; ^ 4;b)T (b 2 f1;2;:::;Bg, where B is the number of bootstrap replications)
the estimates in a particular bootstrap sample b containing n observations that are randomly
drawn from the original data with replacement. The rst method is based on the classical
nonparametric bootstrap, with the exception that it includes a Bonferroni adjustment to
account for the fact that we test four hypotheses jointly.
The basic steps are the following. In each bootstrap sample, we compute the recentered
parameter vector ~ b = ^ b   ^ . Then, the vector of p-values P^  is estimated by the share of
bootstrap replications in which the recentered parameters are larger than the estimates in the
original sample:
P^  = B 1
B X
b=1
If~ b > ^ g; (11)
where Ifg denotes the indicator function.
Even though the p-values are consistent for assessing each constraint separately, they are
not appropriate for making judgements about the joint satisfaction of the constraints. To the
latter end, we use a simple Bonferroni adjustment. As for instance discussed in MacKinnon
(2007), the Bonferroni inequality implies that the p-value for joint hypotheses can be computed
by multiplying the minimum p-value by the number of constraints, in our case four. Therefore,
13the p-value of the bootstrap test, denoted by ^ pbs, is
^ pbs = 4  min(P^ ): (12)
While this procedure is easy to implement, the Bonferroni adjustment has the disadvantage
that it yields too conservative p-values when the test statistics are positively correlated, see for
example the discussion in Romano, Shaikh, and Wolf (2008). A further and probably more
important limitation is that the power of the test decreases as the number of non-binding
constraints increases, which is particularly relevant for the non-binary instrument framework
of Section 5. Indeed, min(P^ ) is not aected by adding irrelevant constraints, but it will be
multiplied by a larger number. This problem and the importance of allowing for a sample
dependent null distribution (for which the number of binding constraints are estimated from the
data) has been acknowledged in a number of papers such as Andrews and Jia (2008), Andrews
and Soares (2010), Bennett (2009), Chen and Szroeter (2009), and Hansen (2005).6 One might
use any approach proposed in these papers or in Donald and Hsu (2010) (which is in the spirit of
Hansen, 2005, with the exception that a simulation approach is used instead of bootstrapping)
to overcome the limitations of the Bonferroni adjustment.
Here, we consider the novel minimum p-value-type test proposed by Bennett (2009) for joint
inequality moment constraints. The test relies on the following, quite general assumptions (see
his Assumption 1) which are satised in a standard GMM framework that may also be used
to characterize our testing problem: (i) i.i.d. sampling, (ii) bounded second moments, (iv)
Lipschitz continuity of the moment functions with the Lipschitz function having bounded second
moments, (v) linear representation of the testing problem. The Bennett (2009) test not only has
an asymptotically exact size, but is - in contrast to Andrews and Jia (2008), Andrews and Soares
(2010), Hansen (2005), and Donald and Hsu (2010) - also invariant to studentization. Compared
6It is worth mentioning that testing inequality constraints is closely related to the fast evolving literature on
inference in models with moment inequalities, see for instance: Andrews and Guggenberger (2007), Andrews and
Soares (2010), Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007), Fan and Park (2007), Guggenberger, Hahn, and Kim
(2008), Linton, Song, and Whang (2008), and Rosen (2008).
14to Chen and Szroeter (2009), it has the advantage that it does not require the choice of any
smoothing function. Furthermore, the test does not rely on the double (i.e., nested) bootstrap
(see Beran, 1988) to estimate the distribution of the minimum p-value min(P^ ) as suggested
in Godfrey (2005), which may be computationally intensive. Instead, it only demands two
individual bootstraps, where the second resamples from the distribution of the rst bootstrap.
Bennett (2009) considers both full (i.e., standard) recentering of inequality constraints and
partial recentering of only those constraints which are either violated in the sample or not
violated but within a small neighborhood of the boundary of the null hypothesis. He shows that
partial recentering (henceforth mP.p) has weakly superior nite sample properties than full
recentering (henceforth mP.f). The algorithm of both methods can be sketched as follows:
1. Estimate the vector of parameters ^  in the original sample.
2. Draw B1 bootstrap samples of size n from the original sample.
3. In each bootstrap sample, compute the recentered vector ~ 
f
b  ^ b   ^  for the mP.f test
and the partially recentered vector ~ 
p
b  ^ b   max(^ ; n) for the mP.p test, where n is a
sequence such that n ! 0 and
p
n  n ! 1 as n ! 1.7
4. Estimate the vector of p-values for mP.f, denoted by P~ f:










n  ^ g: (13)
5. Compute the minimum P-values for mP.f:
^ pf = min(P~ f): (14)
6. Draw B2 values from the distributions of ~ 
f
b and ~ 
p
b. We denote by ~ 
f
b2 and ~ 
p
b2 the resampled
7In the simulations and applications further below, we choose n =
q
2ln(ln(n))
n  ^ i; i 2 f1;2;3;4g, where
^ i is the estimated (in the B1 rst stage bootstrap samples) standard deviation of the i-th inequality constraint,
as suggested by Bennett (2009). It is, however, not guaranteed that this choice is optimal, see for instance the
discussion in Donald and Hsu (2010).
15observations in the second bootstrap.
7. In each bootstrap sample, compute the minimum P-values of mP.f and mP.p, denoted by
^ pf;b2 and ^ pp;b2:
^ pf;b2 = min(P~ f;b2); ^ pp;b2 = min(P~ p;b2); (15)
where










n  ~ 
f










n  ~ 
p
b2g: (16)
8. Compute the p-values of the mP.f and mP.p tests by the share of bootstrapped minimum
p-values that are smaller than the respective minimum p-value of the original sample:








If^ pp;b2  ^ pfg: (17)
As already mentioned, mP.f and mP.p only dier in terms of recentering. The former test
recenters all four constraints, while the latter recenters only the restrictions that either violate
the null or are in the null but close (i.e., within n) to equality in the original sample. Partial
recentering allows estimating the number of binding constraints from the data and therefore
provides a better approximation of the asymptotic distribution of the test under the null. It
dominates mP.f in terms of power while yielding asymptotically exact size, see Bennett (2009).
This nding is corroborated by the simulation results reported in Section 7.
4 Mean dominance and equality constraints
This section discusses restrictions on the order of the mean potential outcomes of dierent pop-
ulations, which were for instance also considered by Huber and Mellace (2010) in an IV context
and Zhang and Rubin (2003) in models with censored outcomes. If these mean dominance as-
16sumptions appear plausible to the researcher, they may be invoked to increase testing power.
The rst assumption considered is mean dominance of the complier outcomes over those of
the always takers under treatment:
Assumption 6:
E(Y (1)jT = c)  E(Y (1)jT = at) (mean dominance of compliers).
Assumption 6 implies that the mean potential outcome of the compliers under treatment is at least
as high as that of the always takers. Therefore, the upper bound of the mean potential outcome
of the always takers in Equation (1) tightens to the conditional mean E(Y jD = 1;Z = 1). Under
Assumptions 1-6, (8) becomes
E(Y jD = 1;Z = 1;Y  yq)  E(Y jD = 1;Z = 0)  E(Y jD = 1;Z = 1); (18)
which generally increases testing power due to the tighter upper bound. Whether this assumption
is plausible depends on the empirical application at hand and has to be justied by theory and/or
empirical evidence. In fact, one could also assume the converse, i.e., that the mean potential
outcome of the compliers cannot be higher than that of the always takers. This is formally stated
in Assumption 7:
Assumption 7:
E(Y (1)jT = c)  E(Y (1)jT = at) (mean dominance of always takers).
In this case, E(Y jD = 1;Z = 1) constitutes the lower bound of the mean potential outcome of
the always takers, and the testable implication becomes
E(Y jD = 1;Z = 1)  E(Y jD = 1;Z = 0)  E(Y jD = 1;Z = 1;Y  y1 q): (19)
Finally, the combination of Assumptions 6 and 7 results in the restriction that the mean
potential outcomes under treatment of the always takers and compliers are the same, yielding
the following equality constraint:
17Assumption 8:
E(Y (1)jT = c) = E(Y (1)jT = at) (equality of means).
Clearly, Assumption 8 entails the highest testing power and implies that
E(Y jD = 1;Z = 1) = E(Y jD = 1;Z = 0); (20)
such that the inequality restrictions turn into an equality constraint. Then, the validity of the
instrument can be tested by a simple two sample t-test for dierences between means. To be
precise, the latter tests the IV assumptions and Assumption 8 jointly: A non-rejection points
to both a valid instrument and homogeneity of the mean potential outcomes of always takers
and compliers under treatment. Note that equivalent results under mean dominance/equality
apply to the compliers and never takers under non-treatment. E.g., assuming E(Y (0)jT = c) =
E(Y (0)jT = nt)
amounts to testing whether
E(Y jD = 0;Z = 1) = E(Y jD = 0;Z = 0): (21)
5 Generalization to non-binary instruments
This section generalizes the testable implications derived under mean independence to bounded
non-binary instruments, which is straightforward in our framework based on moment inequalities.
As discussed in Fr olich (2007), in cases where the support of Z is bounded such that Z 2
[zmin;zmax], it is possible to dene and identify LATEs with respect to any two distinct subsets
of the support of Z. To this end, we need to invoke Assumption 1 along with 2NB to 5NB, which
are generalizations of Assumptions 2 to 5:
Assumption 2NB:
Pr(T = tjZ = z) = Pr(T = t) 8 z in the support of Z (unconfounded type).
18Assumption 3NB:
E(Y (d;z)jT = t) = E(Y (d)jT = t) 8 z in the support of Z, d 2 f0;1g, and t 2 fat;c;d;ntg
(mean exclusion restriction).
Assumption 4NB:
Pr(D(z)  D(z0)) = 1 8 z;z0 satisfying zmin  z0 < z  zmax (monotonicity).
I.e., z and z0 are two distinct subsets of the support of Z such that any element in z is larger
than any element in z0.
Assumption 5NB:
Pr(D(zmax) > D(zmin)) > 0 (existence of compliers):
Then, the LATE for compliers dened upon any z;z0 satisfying zmin  z0  z  zmax and
Pr(D(z) > D(z0)) > 0 is identied by
E(Y (1)   Y (0)jD(Z 2 z) > D(Z 2 z0)) =
E(Y jZ 2 z)   E(Y jZ 2 z0)
E(DjZ 2 z)   E(DjZ 2 z0)
: (22)
Theorem 8 in Fr olich (2007) shows that the LATE on the largest complier population possible
is identied by choosing z = zmax and z0 = zmin. In this light, the logic of Assumption 5NB
becomes more apparent: If it is not satised for zmax;zmin, it does not hold for any pair of z;z0.
However, Assumption 5NB merely states that compliers exist for at least one combination of
distinct values of Z, but not necessarily for all pairs of subsets z;z0. As monotonicity of the
binary treatment implies that each individual switches its treatment status as a reaction to the
instrument at most once under the null, the complier share may be small or even zero for some
pairs z;z0.
While small or zero complier shares are undesirable for LATE estimation, the contrary holds
for testing, as c = 0 maximizes asymptotic power. A further dimension relevant to testing power
is the number of subsets considered. I.e., it is useful to look at all possible pairs of neighboring8
8Note that under Assumptions 4ND, 5ND and for any xed z, neighboring z and z
0 give weakly lower complier
shares than non-neighboring pairs and thus, entail a higher asymptotic power.
19z and z0 for which the moment inequalities in (24) must be satised under instrument validity.
In large samples small subsets therefore appear preferable, rstly to minimize the complier share
and secondly to maximize the number of neighboring pairs of z and z0. However, in small samples
a trade-o between nite sample power and asymptotic power may well occur when doing so.





1 if Z 2 z
0 if Z 2 z0
: (23)
Under Assumptions 1 and 2NB to 5NB, the results of Sections 2 and 3 must also hold when








E(Y j ~ Z = 1;D = 1;Y  yq)   E(Y j ~ Z = 0;D = 1);
E(Y j ~ Z = 0;D = 1)   E(Y j ~ Z = 1;D = 1;Y  y1 q);
E(Y j ~ Z = 0;D = 0;Y  yr)   E(Y j ~ Z = 1;D = 0);









Let n ~ Z be the number of possible choices of ~ Z with neighboring subsets. Testing IV validity
amounts to applying the test procedures outlined in Section 3, where the number of inequality
constraints is now 4n ~ Z instead of 4. To give an example, consider the case that Z may take the
values 0, 1, or 2. The number of possible denitions of ~ Z with neighboring z;z0 is 4:
z0 = 0 z = 1;
z0 = 1 z = 2;
z0 = 0 z = f1;2g;
z0 = f0;1g z = 2:
This implies that we have 4  4 = 16 testable inequality constraints based on neighboring pairs.
Notice that also considering the non-neighboring pair z0 = 0;z = 2 does neither increase nite
20sample power nor asymptotic power: A test base on the non-neighboring pair is weakly dominated
by using z0 = f0;1g;z = 2 and z0 = 0;z = f1;2g in terms of the sample size (which inuences
nite sample power) and entails a weakly higher complier share than any other neighboring pair.
As a nal remark, note that n ~ Z becomes innite when the instrument is continuous. In practice,
the researcher will have to dene a nite number of subsets that depends on the richness of the
data in the application considered and will, thus, again face a trade-o between asymptotic and
nite sample power.
6 Testing under joint independence
Even though stronger than necessary for LATE identication, the literature commonly imposes
the following joint independence assumption instead of Assumptions 2 and 3, see for instance
Imbens and Angrist (1994):
Assumption 2J:
Y (d;z) = Y (d) and Z?(Y (d);D(z)) 8 d 2 f0;1g and z in the support of Z (joint independence).
Assumption 2J states that the potential outcome is a function of treatment, but not of the the
instrument (such that the exclusion restriction holds for any moment) and that the instrument is
independent of the joint distribution of the potential treatment states and the potential outcomes.
It is sucient for the identication of local quantile treatment eects, see Fr olich and Melly (2008),
or other distributional features.
One plausible reason for the popularity of this assumption in LATE estimation is that in
many empirical setups, it does not seem too unlikely that when mean independence holds, also
the stronger joint independence is satised. E.g., if one is willing to assume that an instrument is
mean independent of the outcome variable hourly wage, it might appear reasonable to assume that
it is mean independent of the log of hourly wage, too. As the latter is a (one to one) nonlinear
transformation of the original outcome variable, this also implies independence w.r.t. higher
21moments. From this perspective, strengthening mean independence to joint independence may
often only come with little costs in terms of credibility.9 The subsequent review of the K08 test and
the adaptation of our method to joint independence makes it obvious that Assumption 2J allows
constructing asymptotically more powerful tests based on probability measures (such as density
functions) rather than means only. However, it remains to be shown how to optimally dene these
probability measures in nite samples. From a practical point of view, the mean-based tests may
therefore appear useful even under joint independence due to their ease of implementation (and
potentially better nite sample properties when compared to tests based on ill-chosen probability
measures, see Section 7).
Henceforth assuming a binary instrument, the testing approach proposed in K08 exploits the
fact that under IV validity (now relying on Assumption 2J instead of 2 and 3) and for any subset
V of the support of Y , Pr(Y 2 V;D = djZ = d)   Pr(Y 2 V;D = djZ = 1   d) can be shown to
be equal to Pr(Y 2 V jD = d)  c, and thus, cannot be negative for d 2 f0;1g. The underlying
intuition is that negative densities of complier outcomes must not occur in either treatment state,
see Section 1. This is formally stated in Proposition 1 of K08:10
Pr(Y 2 V;D = 1jZ = 0)  Pr(Y 2 V;D = 1jZ = 1);
Pr(Y 2 V;D = 0jZ = 1)  Pr(Y 2 V;D = 0jZ = 0) 8 V in the support of Y: (24)
Concerning the implementation of the test, K08 proposes the following bootstrap method.
Let n1;n0 denote the numbers of observations with Z = 1 and Z = 0, respectively. Furthermore,
dene P(V;d)  Pr(Y 2 V;D = djZ = 1) and Q(V;d)  Pr(Y 2 V;D = djZ = 0). The sample
9We thank Toru Kitagawa for a fruitful discussion on this topic.
10Equation (7) in Balke and Pearl (1997) and equations (12) and (13) in Richardson, Evans, and Robins (2011)
provide the same constraints for the special case that Y is binary.
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where V is a chosen collection of subsets in the support of Y . As Tn is non-pivotal, the author
suggests to use a bootstrap method for inference that is analogous to Abadie (2002). I.e., B
bootstrap samples of size n are drawn from the original data to compute Tb, the bootstrap
analogue of Tn, in each sample. Then, the p-value is estimated by
^ pK08 = B 1 
B X
b=1
IfTb > Tng: (27)
An open issue of the K08 test is the choice of V. While a large number of subsets increases the
chance to detect a violation and, thus, asymptotic power it may entail a high variance in nite
samples. I.e., there exists a trade-o between the richness of V and the nite sample power.
However, a method for optimally choosing the subsets in nite samples is currently not available.
In what follows we show that equivalent constraints to Proposition 1 of K08 plus two addi-
tional restrictions are obtained when adapting our framework to probability measures (including
the pdf and cdf) rather than means. I.e., equivalent to equations (8) and (9) for the mean po-
tential outcomes, the results of Horowitz and Manski (1995) imply the following bounds on the
probabilities that the potential outcomes of the always takers under treatment and the never tak-
23ers under non-treatment are in some subset V :
Pr(Y 2 V jD = 1;Z = 1)   (1   q)
q
 Pr(Y (1) 2 V jT = at) 
Pr(Y 2 V jD = 1;Z = 1)
q
;
Pr(Y 2 V jD = 0;Z = 0)   (1   r)
r
 Pr(Y (0) 2 V jT = nt) 
Pr(Y 2 V jD = 0;Z = 0)
r
; (28)
where q;r are again the shares of always or never takers in the respective mixed populations.
Under Assumptions 1, 2J and 4 it follows that for all V in the support of Y ,
Pr(Y (1) 2 V jT = at) = Pr(Y 2 V jD = 1;Z = 0);
Pr(Y (0) 2 V jT = nt) = Pr(Y 2 V jD = 0;Z = 1);
and therefore,
Pr(Y 2 V jD = 1;Z = 1)   (1   q)
q
 Pr(Y 2 V jD = 1;Z = 0) 
Pr(Y 2 V jD = 1;Z = 1)
q
;
Pr(Y 2 V jD = 0;Z = 0)   (1   r)
r
 Pr(Y 2 V jD = 0;Z = 1) 
Pr(Y 2 V jD = 0;Z = 0)
r
: (29)
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which may be tested using the same methods as outlined in Section 3. Equivalent to the restric-
tions used in the K08 test, (30) allows us to construct tests with multiple constraints, depending
on the denition of V and the number of the subsets V therein. E.g., it may be applied to the
density function at various points in the outcome distribution. Note that the number of con-
straints obtained is four times the number of V .
24Note that after some simple algebra (see Appendix A.3), (29) can be rewritten as
Pr(Y 2 V;D = 1jZ = 1)   (P1j1   P1j0)  Pr(Y 2 V;D = 1jZ = 0)  Pr(Y 2 V;D = 1jZ = 1);
Pr(Y 2 V;D = 0jZ = 0)   (P1j1   P1j0)  Pr(Y 2 V;D = 0jZ = 1)  Pr(Y 2 V;D = 0jZ = 0);
(31)
which must hold for all V in the support of Y . I.e., (31) includes the constraints (24) discussed
in K08, but in addition implies the following:
Pr(Y 2 V;D = 1jZ = 1)   Pr(Y 2 V;D = 1jZ = 0)  (P1j1   P1j0);
Pr(Y 2 V;D = 0jZ = 0)   Pr(Y 2 V;D = 0jZ = 1)  (P1j1   P1j0): (32)
The intuitive interpretation of this result is that the joint probability of being a complier and
having an outcome that lies in subset V cannot be larger than the (unconditional) complier share
in the population. To see this, dene the probability measures in terms of densities, denoted
by f(y;D = djZ = d). E.g., considering the rst line of (32) it follows that f(y;D = 1jZ =
1)   f(y;D = 1jZ = 0)  (P1j1   P1j0) for all y in the support of Y , because
P1j1   P1j0 =
Z
Y
[f(y;D = 1jZ = 1)   f(y;D = 1jZ = 0)]dy: (33)
This more generally holds for
P
V 2V[Pr(Y 2 V;D = 1jZ = 1)   Pr(Y 2 V;D = 1jZ = 0)] for
any V with non-overlapping subsets V . Equivalent to (8) and (9), the bounds in (29) and (31)
become wider as the complier share (P1j1   P1j0) grows.
A crucial question for the usefulness of the additional constraints is whether (32) may increase
testing power compared to using (24) only. If relying on densities, the answer is negative, at least
as far as asymptotic power is concerned. To see this, note that the prevalence of some y for
which f(y;D = 1jZ = 1) f(y;D = 1jZ = 0) > (P1j1  P1j0) necessarily implies that there exists
some y0 for which f(y0;D = 1jZ = 1)   f(y0;D = 1jZ = 0) < 0 such that (24) is violated, too,
25otherwise (33) cannot be satised. Gains in power might possibly only be realized in particular
testing setups based on \rougher" denitions of V (where negative densities may be averaged
out) which overlap.11 To illustrate this by an example, assume a discrete outcome Y 2 f5;6;7g
with
(i) f(5;D = 1jZ = 1)   f(5;D = 1jZ = 0) = 0:6;
(ii) f(6;D = 1jZ = 1)   f(6;D = 1jZ = 0) = 0:3;
(iii) f(7;D = 1jZ = 1)   f(7;D = 1jZ = 0) =  0:3;
such that P1j1   P1j0 = 0:6. For V : V1 = 5;V2 = 6;V3 = 7 the probability measures correspond
to the densities and the rst constraint of (24) becomes binding for V3. However, when dening
V : V1 = f5;6g;V2 = f6;7g, the negative density (iii) is averaged out by (ii) for V2 such that
(24) is satised. In contrast, (32) is violated for V1, because (i)+(ii) is larger than P1j1   P1j0.
Obviously, with a sample size going to innity, using overlapping V is unnecessary and even
potentially detrimental for the power of (24) for the reasons just discussed. This implies that at
best, the additional constraints raise power in nite samples. This may be the case due to the
use of overlapping subsets V , which needs to justied by an eciency argument, and/or because
violations of (32) occur in regions where estimation is more precise than in areas where (24) is
binding.
We conclude this section by demonstrating that the dominance or equality assumptions (to
further increase power) discussed in Section 4 may analogously be imposed w.r.t. the probabilities
that the potential outcomes of dierent subpopulations are situated in some subset V . E.g., one
possible assumption is probability dominance of the potential outcomes of the compliers over
those of the always takers under treatment:
Assumption 6J:
Pr(Y (1) 2 V jT = c)  Pr(Y (1) 2 V jT = at) (probability dominance of compliers).
11We are indebted to Toru Kitagawa for his helpful comments on this issue.
26Assumption 6J states that compared to the always takers, a weakly higher share within complier
outcomes is concentrated in a particular subset V of the potential outcome distribution under
treatment (including its pdf). This is useful if we have prior knowledge about the concentration of
compliers and always takers in some region of the potential outcome distribution. E.g., related to
Assumption 6 (weak dominance of the mean potential outcomes of compliers), one might assume
that the compliers are relatively more likely to be in the upper part of the distribution, i.e., for
V covering some \upper" part of the support of Y (1). Similar to the intuition of Assumption 6,
Assumption 6J implies that Pr(Y (1) 2 V jT = at)  Pr(Y 2 V jD = 1;Z = 1) (as the latter is a
weighted average of both Pr(Y (1) 2 V jT = c) and Pr(Y (1) 2 V jT = at)) such that the bounds
in the rst row of (29) tighten to
Pr(Y 2 V jD = 1;Z = 1)   (1   q)
q
 Pr(Y 2 V jD = 1;Z = 0)  Pr(Y 2 V jD = 1;Z = 1): (34)
Conversely, one may assume that in some subset V of Y (1), the always takers are relatively
more likely to occur than the compliers:
Assumption 7J:
Pr(Y (1) 2 V jT = c)  Pr(Y (1) 2 V jT = at) (probability dominance of always takers).
In this case Pr(Y (1) 2 V jT = at)  Pr(Y 2 V jD = 1;Z = 1) and the rst row in (29) can be
written as
Pr(Y 2 V jD = 1;Z = 1)  Pr(Y 2 V jD = 1;Z = 0) 
Pr(Y 2 V jD = 1;Z = 1)
q
: (35)
Finally, the strongest restriction is to assume that the same proportions within complier and
always taker outcomes are concentrated in a particular subset:
Assumption 8J:
27Pr(Y (1) 2 V jT = c) = Pr(Y (1) 2 V jT = at) (equality of probabilities),
which implies that
Pr(Y 2 V jD = 1;Z = 1) = Pr(Y 2 V jD = 1;Z = 0): (36)
Note that if Assumption 8J is assumed for any possible denition of the subsets V , this implies
the equality of potential outcome distributions. Analogous assumptions may be imposed on the
potential outcome distributions of the compliers and the never takers under non-treatment.
7 Simulations
We investigate the nite sample properties of the bootstrap tests based on inequality moment
constraints by simulating IV models with both continuous and binary outcomes. For the contin-
uous case, the data generating process (DGP) is the following:
Y = D + Z + U;
D = IfZ + " > 0g;
(U;")  N(0;1); Cov(U;V ) = 0:5; Z;D  Bernoulli(0:5):
The treatment variable D is endogenous due to the correlation of the errors U and " in the
structural and the rst stage equations, respectively. The rst stage coecient  determines the
share of compliers in the population and, thus, the width of the bounds. We therefore expect
testing power to decrease in the coecient. In the simulations  is set to 0.2 and 0.6, which
corresponds to shares of roughly 8 % and 23 %, respectively.12 These gures are well in the range
of complier proportions found in empirical applications, see for instance the examples presented
in Section 8. Whereas monotonicity is satised by the linearity and additivity of our model, 
gauges the violation of the exclusion restriction. The latter is satised for  = 0 and violated for
12The share of compliers is given by ()   (0) = ()   0:5, where () is the cdf of the standard normal
distribution.
28any  6= 0 implying a direct eect of Z on Y . Therefore, power should increase in the absolute
value of , as the probability that E(Y jD = 1;Z = 0) and E(Y jD = 0;Z = 1) fall outside the
parameter bounds in the mixed populations increases in the magnitude of the direct eect. In
the simulations, we set  to 0 and 1.
Table 3 reports the rejection frequencies of the various tests at the 5% level of signicance
for sample sizes n = 250;1000 and 1000 simulations. The rst and second columns indicate
the level of  and , respectively. The third column (st.dist1) gives max(^ 1; ^ 2)=st.dev.(Y ), i.e.,
the maximum distance between the estimate E(Y jD = 1;Z = 0) and the bounds in the mixed
population, standardized by the standard deviation of Y . A positive value implies that the point
estimate of the always takers' mean potential outcome falls outside the bounds, i.e., is either
smaller than the lower bound or higher than the upper bound. The fourth column (st.dist0)
provides the distance parameter for the never takers: max(^ 3; ^ 4)=st.dev.(Y ). Columns 5 and 6
report the bias of the LATE and of the mean dierence in Y of treated and non-treated individuals
(which ignores endogeneity), respectively. The LATE estimator is heavily biased whenever  6= 0
and clearly more so than taking mean dierences. But even under the null with n = 250 and
 = 0:2, the estimator performs poorly, suggesting that we should be cautious when using IV
estimation in small samples when the instrument is weak.
Table 3: Simulations - continuous outcome
n=250 rejection frequencies
mean-based tests probability-based tests
  st.dist1 st.dist0 b.LATE b.di bs mP.p mP.f mP.p(2) mP.f(2) mP.p(4) mP.f(4)
0.2 0.0 -0.090 -0.103 -1.440 0.796 0.007 0.017 0.007 0.031 0.013 0.028 0.004
0.6 0.0 -0.223 -0.313 -0.110 0.774 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.000
0.2 1.0 0.494 0.458 27.841 0.886 0.933 0.960 0.916 0.982 0.961 0.621 0.534
0.6 1.0 0.259 0.096 4.825 1.009 0.380 0.506 0.373 0.794 0.691 0.380 0.245
n=1000 rejection frequencies
mean-based tests probability-based tests
  st.dist1 st.dist0 b.LATE b.di bs mP.p mP.f mP.p(2) mP.f(2) mP.p(4) mP.f(4)
0.2 0.0 -0.118 -0.138 -0.282 0.795 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.003 0.015 0.003
0.6 0.0 -0.243 -0.357 -0.009 0.772 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
0.2 1.0 0.505 0.482 17.121 0.877 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.992 0.982
0.6 1.0 0.249 0.094 4.491 1.010 0.930 0.965 0.928 0.998 0.994 0.982 0.945
Note: Rejection frequencies at the 5% level. All tests are based on 499 bootstrap draws.
Columns 7 to 9 display the rejection frequencies for the tests based on the constraints under
29mean independence in (10), namely the bootstrap test with Bonferroni adjustment (bs), the
Bennett (2009) test based on minimum p-values with partial (mP.p) and full (mP.f) recentering.
Also columns 10 to 13 refer to versions of the Bennett (2009) test, however, using the probability-
based constraints of (30) under joint independence. The partially and fully recentered statistics
mP.p(2) and mP.f(2) rely on two subsets V which are obtained by cutting the distribution of Y
in each simulation into two. I.e., the breakpoint between the subsets is half the dierence of the
maximum and minimum values of the simulated outcome ((max(Y ) min(Y ))=2). By considering
just two subsets we sacrice asymptotic power, but gain nite sample power. Finally, mP.p(4)
and mP.f(4) use four subsets based on the following partition: V1 = ( 1; 1);V2 = [ 1;0);V3 =
[0;1);V4 = [1;1). As for the K08 test, the optimal choice of the subsets V is an unsolved issue.
From this perspective, the tests based on the constraints under mean independence may appear
more readily applicable than those based on joint independence. Note that for all tests, the
number of bootstrap draws is set to 499.
Under the null hypothesis ( = 0) the rejection frequencies of any method are quite low and
clearly smaller than 5%. As expected, the empirical size decreases in , because the bounds
become wider due to a higher share of compliers, and in the sample size, which makes the
estimation of ^  more precise. Under the violation of IV validity ( = 1) all tests gain power
as the sample size grows and lose power as the share of compliers becomes larger. The most
powerful approach in the given scenario appears to be the partially recentered minimum p-value
test based on the probability constraints (mP.p(2)), which dominates any other method whenever
the null does not hold. Note that also the fully recentered version (mP.f(2)) is more powerful
than all tests based on the mean constraints. In contrast, mP.p(4) is less powerful than (mP.p)
for n = 250 as well as for  = 0:2 and n = 1000, whereas the converse is true for  = 0:6 and
n = 1000. This demonstrates that the choice of subsets aects the relative performance of the
tests and that the appropriateness of a particular choice is a function of both the sample size and
the features of the DGP.
Table 4 presents the rejection frequencies when the outcome is binary (probability-based tests
30Table 4: Simulations - binary outcome
n=250 rejection frequencies
mean-based tests prob.-based tests
  st.dist1 st.dist0 b.LATE b.di bs mP.p mP.f mP.p(2) mP.f(2)
0.2 0.0 -0.017 -0.082 -0.557 0.225 0.008 0.025 0.009 0.032 0.010
0.6 0.0 -0.082 -0.441 -0.032 0.212 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
0.2 1.0 0.132 0.715 6.031 0.073 0.795 0.848 0.527 0.849 0.769
0.6 1.0 0.123 0.106 0.856 0.113 0.186 0.339 0.124 0.338 0.185
n=1000 rejection frequencies
mean-based tests prob.-based tests
  st.dist1 st.dist0 b.LATE b.di bs mP.p mP.f mP.p(2) mP.f(2)
0.2 0.0 -0.040 -0.126 -0.088 0.226 0.003 0.009 0.002 0.010 0.004
0.6 0.0 -0.110 -0.522 0.000 0.212 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.2 1.0 0.131 0.759 3.685 0.071 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
0.6 1.0 0.121 0.142 0.800 0.115 0.817 0.902 0.792 0.899 0.813
Note: Rejection frequencies at the 5% level. All tests are based on 499 bootstrap draws.
with four subsets are therefore not considered). The DGP is identical to the rst one with the
exception that
Y = IfD + Z + U > 0g:
In this case, the true treatment eect depends on the parameter  and is 0.386 for  = 0:2
and 0.403 for  = 0:6. Also for the binary outcome, the LATE estimator is severely biased for
 6= 0. Concerning testing, note that the mean tests need to be modied in a innocuous way to
be suitable for binary outcomes.
As before, all tests are quite conservative under the null and even more so for the larger share of
compliers and/or sample size. Under the violation of IV validity, the minimum p-value-based test
with partial recentering is again most powerful. However, in contrast to the continuous outcome
case, the mean- and probability-based versions of the test have similar power. In conclusion,
mP.p(2) appears to be the preferred choice in the simulations considered as it is competitive
under either denition of the outcome.
318 Application
This section presents an application to the labor market data of Card (1995), who evaluates the
returns to college education based on the 1966 and 1976 waves of the U.S. National Longitudinal
Survey of Young Men (NLSYM) (3,010 observations). Among others, he uses a dummy for
proximity to a 4-year college in 1966 as an instrument for the potentially endogenous decision
of going to college. Proximity should induce some individuals (in particular those from low
income families) to strive for a college degree who would otherwise not, for instance due to costs
associated with not living at home. However, the instrument may well be correlated with factors
like local labor market conditions or family background (e.g. parents' education, which could
shape preferences for particular residential areas) which might be related to the outcome (log
of weekly earnings in 1976). This has been acknowledged by Card (1995) himself, who for this
reason includes a range of control variables in his estimations. For testing, we follow K08 (who
also considers this data set) and dene the educational level as binary treatment which indicates
one's education to be 16 years or more such that it roughly corresponds to a four year college
degree. Again similar to K08, we test IV validity both in the entire sample (i.e., unconditionally)
and in a subsample. The latter only includes white individuals living in an urban area not
located in the south whose fathers have at least 12 years of education (554 observations), in order
to control for factors that are potentially correlated with both the instrument and the outcome.
Table 5 presents the results of the tests on IV validity. The rst column gives the estimated
complier proportion, which is crucial for the power of the tests, the second and third columns
report the standardized maximum distances max(^ 1; ^ 2)=st.dev.(Y ), max(^ 3; ^ 4)=st.dev.(Y ). The
remaining columns contain the p-values of the bootstrap test with Bonferroni adjustment (bs)
and the Bennett (2009) test with partial and full recentering, based on both the constraints on the
means (mP.p, mP.f) and on the probabilities with 2 and 4 subsets V (mP.p(2), mP.f(2),mP.p(4),
mP.f(4)), respectively, dened by an equidistant grid over the support of Y .When considering the
results for the full sample, we see that the point estimate of the mean potential outcome of the
never takers falls well outside its bounds. This violation is highly signicant, as all tests reject
32the null at the 1% level. Therefore, proximity does not appear to be an unconditionally valid
instrument. In the subsample, however, IV validity cannot be rejected. None of the constraints
is binding and accordingly, all tests yield very large p-values. This is in line with the the results
of K08 and demonstrates the importance of carefully considering potential confounders, i.e.,
variables that are both related with the instrument and the outcome, in empirical applications.
Table 5: Application to Card (1995) - IV validity tests
p-values
mean-based tests probability-based tests
Sample compliers st.dist1 st.dist0 bs mP.p mP.f mP.p(2) mP.f(2) mP.p(4) mP.f(4)
full sample 6.9 % -0.203 0.224 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.006
subsample 13.2 % -0.419 -0.302 1.000 0.787 1.000 0.979 0.735 0.907 0.997
Note: All tests are based on 1999 bootstrap draws.
Finally, we test the mean equality constraints (20) and (21) using two sample t-tests. Table 6
reports the sample analogues of E(Y jD = d;Z = z) (where z;d 2 f0;1g), denoted by  YD=d;Z=z,
the dierences (di)  YD=1;Z=1    YD=1;Z=0 and  YD=0;Z=0    YD=0;Z=1, and the respective (asymp-
totic) p-values (p-val). Not surprisingly, the tests yield low p-values for the full sample of Card
(1995), which did not even satisfy the weaker inequality constraints. In contrast, the subsample
also passes the stricter dierence of means tests at any conventional level of signicance. This
suggests that IV validity and homogeneity of the mean potential outcomes of compliers and al-
ways takers under treatment and of compliers and never takers under non-treatment hold.
Table 6: Application to Card (1995) - dierence of means tests
Sample  YD=1;Z=1  YD=1;Z=0 di p-val  YD=0;Z=0  YD=0;Z=1 di p-val
full sample 6.449 6.369 0.081 0.012 6.094 6.254 -0.160 0.000
subsample 6.465 6.483 -0.018 0.806 6.348 6.390 -0.043 0.569
9 Conclusion
The LATE framework of Imbens and Angrist (1994) and Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996)
with a binary treatment and instrument implies that the mean potential outcome of the always
takers under treatment and that of the never takers under non-treatment can be both point
33identied and bounded. As the points must lie within their respective bounds, this provides
four testable inequality moment constraints for instrument validity, a fact apparently neglected
in the literature. For this reason we propose bootstrap tests, of which the minimum p-value-
based method with partial recentering of Bennett (2009) appears to be most appropriate in
terms of nite sample behavior. As a further contribution, it is shown how testing power might
be increased by imposing restrictions on the order of the mean potential outcomes of dierent
subpopulations which has also been considered in Huber and Mellace (2010), among others.
Moreover, we demonstrate that IV validity and homogeneity in mean potential outcomes across
particular subpopulations can be tested jointly by simple dierence of means tests.
We also relate our work to the approach of Kitagawa (2008) who tests for the incidence of
negative densities of complier outcomes to verify instrument validity. Interestingly, by adapting
our framework to probabilities rather than means of potential outcomes, one obtains the same
testable implications as Kitagawa (2008) plus two additional constraints not considered before.
The latter might increase testing power in nite samples under particular conditions. Finally, we
briey investigate the nite sample properties of our tests and consider an empirical application
to the labor market data of Card (1995).
The testing problem discussed in this paper raises the question of what can be done about
identication if instrument validity is rejected. Obviously, the most appropriate solution would
be to search for better instruments, but this may not always be feasible in practice. As an
alternative, one could relax some of the IV assumptions. Then, point identication is lost, but
the LATE might still be partially identied within reasonable bounds in the spirit of Manski
(1989). E.g., Flores and Flores-Lagunes (2010) derive bounds on the LATE when the exclusion
restriction is violated, but monotonicity of the treatment in the instrument holds, while Huber
and Mellace (2010) consider the violation of monotonicity, but maintain the exclusion restriction.
34A Appendix
A.1 GMM framework
In order to show that the tests described in Section 3 are valid it is sucient to show that all the parameters
involved in estimating the test statistics vector  can be consistently estimated in a GMM framework. The latter
satises Assumption 1 of Bennett (2009), which encounters standard conditions such as i.i.d. sampling, uniformly
bounded moments of the moment functions up to a particular order, Lipschitz continuity, and an asymptotically
linear representation of the testing problem. In the spirit of Lee (2009), it can be shown that 01  E(Y jD =
1;Z = 0), 10  E(Y jD = 0;Z = 1), 
lb
11  E(Y jD = 1;Z = 1;Y  yq), 
ub
11  E(Y jD = 1;Z = 1;Y  y1 q),

lb
00  E(Y jD = 0;Z = 0;Y  yr) and 
ub
00  E(Y jD = 0;Z = 0;Y  y1 r) can be estimated as the unique
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T is the (12  1)-vector of parameters and Wi =
(Yi;Zi;Di).









A consistent estimator of the parameter vector # can be obtained by solving the following minimization problem




n-consistency and asymptotic normality of ^ # follows directly from Propositions 2 and 3 in Lee (2009). In
particular, from Theorem 7.2 of Newey and McFadden (1994) it follows that
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where H(#0)  r#0E(g(#;Wi)) is the derivative of E(g(#;Wi)) at #0, the true value of #, and 
(#0) is the
asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of g(#0;Wi). Theorem 7.2 of Newey and McFadden (1994) also ensures that
the regularity conditions listed in Assumption 1 of Bennett (2009) are met and that the limiting distribution of
the test statistics  exists and is continuous.
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where 0rc is a r  c-matrix of zeros. Denoting by fdz the pdf of Y given D = d and Z = z, the non-zero
components of H(#0) are
Hlb















































13As suggested by Newey and McFadden (1994) 
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A consistent estimator of the asymptotic variance of ^ # is given by n




 1. Then, it is
straightforward to construct an estimator for the variance of the test statistic ^ , see Appendix A.2.
A.2 Wolak (1989, 1991) test
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We would like to test the null hypothesis H0 : C#  0 against H1 : C# > 0. Theorem 7.2 of Newey and McFadden
(1994) implies that # satises Assumption 1 of Donald and Hsu (2010). Therefore, it follows that
p
n  (C ^ #   C#0)
d ! N(0;J(#0));










n  (C ^ #   C#)
TJ(^ #)
 1(C ^ #   C#)
14Wolak (1989a) proposes three asymptotically equivalent test statistics.
38Let #
 be the LFC (i.e., the parameter conguration for which the null is rejected with the lowest probability). As
Wolak (1991) shows, #
 2 B where B is the set of # which satisfy the null hypothesis such that there are at least
two constraints that hold as equality. Moreover, for any # 2 B,
lim
n!1












where m is the number of constraints that hold as equality, Cm is the corresponding sub-matrix of C and  (m;m 
i;) is a weighting function. Let s be a m-dimensional vector of normally distributed elements with mean zero
















m) = ; (A.2)





Since we have four inequality constraints, the number of congurations of # such that # 2 B is 11 (all possible
combinations of the four constraints such that at least two of them hold as equality). This implies that (A.2) must
be evaluated 11 times in order to obtain the LFC.
A.3 Proof of equation (31)
First of all, notice that
Pr(Y 2 V jD = 1;Z = 1)   (1   q)
q
=
Pr(Y 2 V;D = 1jZ = 1)













Pr(Y 2 V jD = 1;Z = 1)
q
=
Pr(Y 2 V;D = 1jZ = 1)
q  Pr(D = 1jZ = 1)
(A.4)
=




Pr(Y 2 V jD = 1;Z = 0) =
Pr(Y 2 V;D = 1jZ = 0)
P1j0
: (A.5)
Therefore the rst line of 29 can be written as






Pr(Y 2 V;D = 1jZ = 0)
P1j0





Pr(Y 2 V;D = 1jZ = 1)   (P1j1   P1j0)  Pr(Y 2 V;D = 1jZ = 0)  Pr(Y 2 V;D = 1jZ = 1):
(A.6)
An equivalent argument can be used to obtain the second line.
A.4 Discrete outcomes
In the main text we have shown how to bound E(Y (1)jT = at) and E(Y (1)jT = nt) when the outcome is continuous,
here we will consider the case of discrete outcomes. For the sake of brevity we will just consider the always takers'
bounds, as an analogous argument applies to the never takers. If the outcome has a discrete mass distribution, the
shares of individuals for which Y  yqjD = 1;Z = 1 and Y  y1 qjD = 1;Z = 1 may dier from q. This is due
to the presence of ties in the outcome, i.e. the occurrence of mass points with equal outcome values, which entails
a non-unique quantile function such that a particular outcome value is observed at several ranks. Therefore, the
trimming rule based on the quantile functions described above does not provide the sharp bounds of E(Y (1)jT = at)
in general. In the presence of mass points in the outcome we have to replace the non-unique quantile functions,
which give equal ranks to all ties, by modied versions which account for ties in the trimming rule.
To this end, we denote by n1;1 the number of observations for which Z = 1 and D = 1 and by Y1;1 the









1;1 :::  Y
(n1;1)
1;1 . Note that this implies that for all observations Z = 1 and D = 1 with the same outcome
value the order may be randomly assigned as it does not play any role for the results as it will become apparent
further below. Since the number of always takers in the subsample with Z = 1 and D = 1 is exactly qn1;1, the lower




1;1 at the lowest






1;1 ). For the upper bound of E(Y (1)jT = at), we average over











40If qn1;1 is not an integer one can replace it with its integer part denoted by ^ q  n1;1. Note that we take the integer
part of q  n1;1 because the number of always takers cannot be bigger than q  n1;1. It easy to see that the share of




1;1 , which is given by ~ q =
^ qn1;1
n1;1 , is approximately q (and is exactly q if q  n1;1
is an integer). Notice that q   ~ q ! 0 as n1;1 ! 1.
To give an example assume that q = 0:6 and n1;1 = 11. Moreover, suppose that in the subsample with Z = 1
and D = 1 we have ve observations for which Y = 0, three observations with Y = 1, while the remaining three take
the values 1:1, 1:2, and 1:3. Therefore, the order statistic of Y1;1 is given by (0;0;0;0;0;1;1;1;1:1;1:2;1:3)
0. Since
the always takers are 0:611 = 6:6 in the subsample where Z = 1 and D = 1, we approximate q n1;1 = 6:6 by its




and the upper bound is relies on Y
max
1;1 = (1;1;1:1;1:2;1:3)
0. In this example, ~ q =
6
11 = 0:5455 which is not too far
from q = 0:6 even though n1;1 is small. If we applied the standard trimming rule, we would get yq = 1 and y1 q = 0.
Therefore, the share of observations for which Y  yqjD = 1;Z = 1 is
8
11 = 0:7273, while Y jD = 1;Z = 1  y1 q is
11
11 = 1. This demonstrates that the bounds of E(Y (1)jT = at) based on the standard trimming rule are not valid.
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